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Abstract
A half-century ago, Eero Saarinen and Associates collaborated with the structural engineers of Ammann &
Whitney in the design, documentation, and oversight of two very different, and completely unprecedented,
concrete shell projects: Kresge Auditorium (1951-55) and TWA Terminal (1956-62). The building designs
were intentionally anomalous from traditional shell projects, particularly in the manner by which they
deviated from conventional structural logic of their forms-albeit in very different ways.
Unsurprisingly, the construction challenges for the projects were equally different and profound, requiring a
great deal of innovation and collaboration. Design teams had to devise ways to work collaboratively to address
the particular challenges of designing, analyzing, documenting, and supervising the construction for these
concrete shells.
The paper will examine how the notorious construction complications and the resulting structural failures of
Kresge Auditorium led to an evolution in the collaborative design relationship, more thorough and inventive
documentation, and the development and integration of a rigorous plan for construction of TWA. By
examining original construction documents, construction photos, and correspondence between the firms, the
paper will demonstrate how an increased focus on the constructability became a common goal between the
two firms and how this resulted in a more technically thorough process of design and construction for TWA,
in spite of its more complicated form and elevated technical challenges.
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Abstract 
"Today you and 1 are concerned with the integration of architecture with different kinds of 
engineering and construction. "- Eero Saarinen, Addre.~:s to AlA conference, October 24, 1952 
"In many cases (Saarinen) has relied upon the sheer ingenuity of modern technology to get 
him out of difficulties that would have presented insurmountable obstacles a quarter of a century 
ago " - N Keith Scott, 1955 
A half-century ago, Eero Saarinen and Associates collaborated with the structural engineers 
of Ammann & Whitney in the design, documentation, and oversight of two very different, and 
completely unprecedented, concrete shell projects: Kresge Auditorium (1951-55) and TWA 
Terminal (1956-62). The building designs were intentionally anomalous from traditional shell 
projects, particularly in the manner by which they deviated from conventional structural logic of 
their forms-albeit in very different ways. 
Unsurprisingly, the construction challenges for the projects were equal1y different and pro-
found, requiring a great deal of innovation and collaboration. Design teams had to devise ways to 
work collaboratively to address the particular challenges of designing, analyzing, documenting, 
and supervising the construction for these concrete shells. 
The paper will examine how the notorious construction complications and the resulting struc-
tural failures of Kresge Auditorium led to ~n evolution in the collaborative design rylationship, 
more thorough and inventive documentation, and the development and integration of a rigorous 
plan for construction of TWA. By examining original construction documents, construction pho-
tos, and correspondence between the firms, the paper wil1 demonstrate how an increased focus 
on the constructability became a common goal between the two firms and how this resulted in a 
more techilica11y thorough process of design and construction for TWA, in spite of its more 
complicated form and elevated technical challenges. 
Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, Dept. of Architecture, 146 Co llege of Design, 
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A Tripod Dome Built on Tricky Framework: Kresge Auditorium (1951-55) 
"A dome of thin shell concrete seemed rightfor an institution interested in progressive tech-
nology." - Eero Saarinen, The Technology Review, June, 1955 
In May 1954, soon after a majority of the scaffolding was removed from below the new roof 
of Kresge Auditorium on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's campus, TIME magazine 
photographed the project's architect, Eero Saarinen, in a series of 
contemplative poses in which the arch itect stood on, in, and under 
the largest free-standing concrete shell building in the U.S. (Fig-
ure 1 ). Saarinen knew of the difficult and costly construction con-
ditions that proceeded this moment, and he knew that the roof was 
currently undergoing a steady and unabated six-week long phase 
of sagging that threatened the viability of the structure itself (Co-
hen et. al., 1985). Seemingly unaware of the pending compl ica-
tions, or Saarinen's role in creating these issues, the article lauded 
hi s boldness and contemplated the impact ofthe work (source). 
The work was certainly impactful, but mostly as a warning for 
what could happen if the architectural forrn and engineering ef-
forts aren't properly coordinated with the inherent constraints of 
thin shell construction. 
Figure I: Saarinen looking up the 
arched beams of Kresge 
Many of the problems started with the design process. Saarinen's office frequently worked in 
models at the beginning of projects to give the proposals a sense of scale and to suggest potential 
materials and construction methods. In 1950, they created a plasticine model with a triangular 
curved form that rested only on the three end points. It was named the Vulgar Freak and quickly 
dismissed because the shape (a 1/8th segment of a sphere) didn 't match any conventional struc-
tural logic for concrete shells or auditoria acoustics (Figure 2). However, over the next two 
weeks Saarinen made the case that the forrn would work functionally with a triangulated audito-
rium, that the dome shape would be contextual on 
campus, and that the three points of consolidated 
support would allow huge floor to ceil ing glass 
windows under the roof. Saarinen renamed it the 
Loved One and work proceeded (Saarinen, 1953). 
Although Saarinen was confident publicly that the 
unique forrn was "structurally appropriate" it was, 
in fact, highly speculative. Not only was the scale 
of the project unprecedented for a concrete shell 
(160' clear span), there was no relevant example 
for how it would be drawn, engineered or even Figure 2: Final mode/for Kresge, 1952 
constructed. 
Saarinen hired Ammann & Whitney to be his structural engineers, and even though they 
were the nation's leading experts in the relatively new field of concrete she ll engineering, Saari-
nen didn ' t seek their advice about how to design the roof forrn; they were simply asked to "make 
it work" (Roche, 2014). The engineering challenge was exceedingly difficult, in part because the 




overall shell form established by Saarinen didn't comply with any previously tested or construct-
ed shells. The engineers endeavored to make the building work by simply modifying parts of the 
existing form but their untested (and untestable) suggestions simply wouldn't work as planned. 
As an example, because the geometric shell configuration wasn't structurally efficient they sug-
gested the inclusion of deep curved arch beams springing from the three support points as a way 
to compensate for the inevitable bending stress. The theory was that this would allow the double-
curved roof form to act as a structural shell and retain its modest 3.5" (9 em) structural thickness. 
Instead, the arched beams took on more stress than planned and became the root of the structural 
problems the building endured (Penn State Univ.). Ironically, these changes were made to try 
and retain Saarinen's vision for the building's form, not for reasons of structural or construction 
efficiency, and yet because they didn ' t work as planned, they inadvertently impacted this vision. 
Somewhat surprisingly given Ammann & Whitney's reputation on shell design, the Kresge 
construction documents only marginally acknowledged the unique construction challenges of 
building a she ll. Mostly standard language about concrete casting and formwork was used in the 
specifications and they abdicated much of the responsibility for coordinating this work to the 
contractor, including the ability to determine the "design, fabrication, and erection of the shell 
falsework and forms, the pouring procedure (one pour or in sections with joints), and the decen-
tering procedure" (Project Specs, 1952). These are incredibly broad expansions of authority to 
give to a contractor, particularly because these choices can adversely affect structural perfor-
mance. When construction began in May 1953, George A. Fuller Company, had to sort through 
~ the unique complications of construction with only marginal input and instruction from the de-
sign team. 
Figures 3A-3C (L toR).· Fig. 3A , Formwork plan, Fig. 38, Scaffolding under roof, Fig. 3C, !ncompleteformwork 
Because the contractor chose to pour the concrete foundations and auditorium seating first, 
the formwork for the double-curved roof wou ld need to be formed atop the sloped seating- an 
incredibly difficult, and not very accurate process for setting the proper geometry (Eng. News 
Record, 1954). To get an accurate reference points, the contractor logically set the arched beams 
first. Using a full-sized template built in a hangar, the framework for all the arched beams were 
made off-site and then placed around the building perimeter accurately and shored below with 
scaffold ing (Bates, 1954). The beam heights were used as reference points to complete the dou-
ble-curved shell form . The roofs formwork was a jungle of scaffolding topped with a custom 
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wood bracing and framing that allowed a series of 1 x 7 wood beams to run horizontally, like 
contours, at the critical heights of the roof slope (Figures 3A, 3B & 3C). All of the work was cus-
tomized and there was no repeating the formwork so the process was very labor-intensive and 
expensive. 
The job's foreman, Douglas Bates described how the roof was poured in separate segments 
because the "single continuous operation" option given in the specifications wasn't realistic 
(Bates, 1954). By pouring the roof after the auditorium, the roof construction was pushed to the 
winter months which complicated things considerably. The pouring process was very difficult, 
not only because of the cold weather, but because they had an inexperienced crew pouring very 
thin shell with raised edges and steep slopes. Because the slope was incredibly steep near the 
supports, the first pours needed counterforms which obscured the visibi li ty of the concrete 
placement at the critical junction to the foundation. The thin roof depth barely had an acceptable 
thickness of cover around the large criss-
crossing rebar during ideal pouring conditions. 
The edge beams were formed and poured sepa-
rately from the roof which was a problem as 
they were intended to be structurally integral 
throughout. (Figure 4). A 2" layer of Gunite was 
added atop the roof shell to be used for securing 
the roofing material (originally lead-coated cop-
per tiles) but this layer was cracked severely by 
the building movement and had to be fixed with 
a pourable acrylic polymer binder, which also 
failed (Boothby et. al., 2005). Ultimately, it took 
nearly 100 days to complete the roof and it per-
formed terribly structurally once the forms were 
removed. The arched beams sagged three times 
Figure 4: Evidence of construction complications in 
pouring the shell 
the acceptable distance (5" total) before they were re-shored with scaffolding, only to be eventu-
ally supported by steel columns embedded in the glass curtainwall. There remained persistent 
problems with roof cracking and leaking for the next 25 years, and when Ammann & Whitney 
was asked to investigate their work in 1979 they found that significant portions of the arched 
beams and shells had cracked and deteriorated, mostly near the buttresses, to the point at which 
they needed to be replaced (Cohen et. af., 1985). 
It was clear that much of the problems on Kresge stem med from the fact that the building 
simply wasn't designed with its means of construction and structural performance in mind. In-
stead of proactively addressing these potential problems as part of the design and documentation 
process, these responsibilities were either ignored or abdicated. Even Saarinen joined the criti-
cism, "In retrospect, one has to criticize this bui lding . . . we learned that one cannot depend on 
geometry for the sake of geometry" (Saarinen, 1958). To avoid these consequences on subse-
quent projects, he could have opted for more conventional or structurally logical forms going 
forward, but instead aspired to create an even more complex design for the TWA Term inal that 
his partner Kevin Roche described as "more of a structural problem than a structural solution" 
(Whitehead, 2014). The project teams were committed to learn from these mistakes of Kresge 
and they devised ways to work collaboratively to address the particular challenges of designing, 
analyzing, documenting, and supervising the construction for this project that Ada Louise Hux-
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table called a "stunning manipulation ofreinforced concrete into unconventional forms of arbi-
trary but dazzling grace" (Huxtable, 1962). 
A Soaring Experiment: Trans World Airline Terminal; (1956-62) 
"It wasn 't meant to be a thin shell- it was a sculpture placed around a process of move-
ment. "- Kevin Roche, 2014. 
Saarinen's first sketch ofTWA showed the building as one large undulating elliptical parabo-
loid shell structure-an ambitious but intuitively reasonable shape for a concrete shell. He ex-
pressed his desire to make a "dynamic building form" and he clearly understood from Kresge 
that the challenge was, "how to make the vaults, whose compressive forces are always down-
ward, become soaring rather than earthbound" (Eero Saarinen & Assoc.) But as the project de-
veloped Saarinen intentiona lly strayed from structural logic, stating, "(The) structural and ration-
al cannot always take precedent when another form proves more beautiful. This is dangerous but 
I believe true" (Saarinen, "General Statement," undated). Saarinen's office again built dozens of 
small initial models, casting many of them in complex double curved forms similar to Saarinen's 
furniture designs. Eventually a clover-shaped continuous roof shell with four separate bulges and 
a cantilevering edge beam around the perimeter was proposed. But because this scheme repeated 
many of the same structural mistakes as Kresge (e.g., it couldn't be poured without roof joints 
which would cause the shell to fail, the edge beam would counter-act the membrane action, etc.), 
an opportunity presented itself for Abba Tor, a young engineer tasked with developing the TWA 
engineering, to point out these problems and to seek out a mutually beneficial solution. 
Figures 5A-5C (left to right) : Fig. SA, Buttress model showing ruled surfaces, Fig.SB , Model of skylight, Fig. SC, 
Model of four-quadrant roof scheme (Ya le Un iversity Archives). 
Although Tor called TWA a "creature which started out wild and needed to be tamed and 
domesticated," his suggestions weren ' t intended to radically change the building form, only to 
make sure the project could be successfully engineered and built as intended- a sentiment 
shared by Saarinen (Ringli, 2011 ). Tor wanted to see the four bulges somehow split apart so they 
could be cast independently and operate more autonomously structura lly. Happily, Saarinen was 
also contemplating ways to make the shell s more gestura l and open on the inside and so the pro-
ject was changed from one large undulating shell into four separate, arched, barrel-vault quad-
rants, separated by continuous skylights, with expressive, continuous, curving, and cantilevered 
beams along the edges, connected back to a central keystone in the middle (Figure 5). Each por-
tion of the roof she ll could now also have a varied thickness, depending on the desired geometry 
and structural constraints, and each quadrant could be poured continuously, ideally in only one 
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day, which eliminated concerns for concrete shrinkage and construction joints. This final scheme 
wasn't structurally efficient but it was certainly structurally innovative, and unlike Kresge, this 
scheme was also motivated by a certain construction logic. Both parties take credit for the design 
change and each set about documenting and engineering these complex forms. 
Saarinen's office turned again to model-making as a way to refine the design, but these 
new models were so huge that the only way they could accurately build the model was to gener-
ate sectional templates for the different arch profiles of the roof at the edges and the middle of 
the shells and then to join the pieces together to form a surface with rectangular pieces of paper 
mimicking the formwork pattern (Figure 
6). Roche, who helped build the models, 
described it as a very methodical process 
with an underlying logic of 2D to 3D 
translation that was then used reversed to 
document the form accurately again in 2D 
for the construction documents (Roche, 
2014). At Ammann & Whitney, they had 
no choice but to engineer the building from 
first principles, like any piece of huge 
sculpture, and they relied upon certain as-
sumptions on basic equilibrium and engi-
neering principles for the engineering. The 
challenge was in carefully coordinating the 
construction. 
Figure 6: Saarinen looking at large scale model of TWA 
with roof profile beams in place, 1960, Photo B. Korab. 
Although the new scheme was more logical, it was still an unprecedented undertaking to 
try and construct a project like this and so both firms spent a great deal of time producing a thor-
oughly coordinated, and unprecedented set of construction documents and oversight efforts. 
More than 130 architectural and structural construction drawings were required to represent the 
unique geometric and structural properties of the building's elements. In addition to the arch pro-
file drawings used to make the models, the architectural and structural plans showed contour line 
and spot elevations to in-
dicate variations in slab 
thickness, gridded serial 
sections of plan and eleva-
tiona! drawings of the col-
umns that described the 
evolving geometric forms, 
and a unique and rigorous 
set of specifications and 
requirements for submit-
tals (Figure 7). Figures 7A-B: Fig. 7A, Design drawing ofthe arch f orm geometry , Fig. 78, Struc-tural drawing of shell showing critical elevations of curve 
Both firms were immersed in the two-year construction administration process, placing 
representatives from each firm on-site throughout construction where they worked with the con-
tractors, Grove, Shepard, Wilson & Kruge every day. Unlike Kresge, the plans for how to form 
and pour the shell were developed collaboratively with all parties on-site in accordance with the 
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drawings and specification which called out "every detail of the construction operation ... from 
forming to finishing" (Yeakel, 1962). Because ofthe uncompromising requirements in the doc-
uments for construction process and structural behavior, specifically the requirement that each 
shell must be poured continuously in one-day with only minimal allowable dimensional deflec-
tion after the scaffolding wa removed, it took nine months to prepare a manual which outlined 
the plans for forming, finishing, and testing the tolerances of the concrete. 
Forming the underside of the roof was again done with scaffolding, but unlike the some-
what random arrangement at Kresge, this scaffolding was laid out on a · that dictated 
the exact placement of the scaffolding vertical elements. 
The only computer used on this project was used by the 
contractor to calculate the exact height of each vertical 
scaffolding post, all 1,800 of them, to make sure the antic-
ipated curvature was met. Each post was held in place 
with prefabricated wedges (cut at the proper angle) with a 
u-shaped end receiver to hold the main support beams of 
the formwork. They were within '14" tolerance throughout, 
even with the complicated geometry of the forms pro-
posed (Arch. Forum, 1960). After the bottom surface was 
fully formed and sealed, the contractor spray-painted spot 
elevations on top ofthe formwork (in the same locations 
as the construction drawings showed) to guide the pouring 
process from above (Figure 8). Three test panels were 
constructed to simulate the most difficult placing condi-
tions of angle of incline and amount of reinforcing to fully 
prepare for the pouring process which had been pinpoint-
ed with "unforgiving tolerances" (Yeakel, 1962). 
Figure 8: Top view of keystone form work 
with spot elevations showing proposed 
concrete depth, Photo A. Tor, 1960. 
Because ofthe need to have different 
concrete slump mixes for different portions of 
the shell, there was a mobile concrete batch sta-
tions on-site that wou ld mix and deliver the con-
crete to the crane operator. Over 150 workers 
helped pour each section of the roof; they wore 
a shirt with a giant number on it that corre-
sponded with an assigned work position on the 
roof (Figure 9). Two 180-foot, 45-ton cranes 
hoisted the concrete to the workers in modestly 
sized one cubic yard loads- the process was so 
coordinated that each bucket was color coded 
with paint to assure that it was being placed in 
the right location on the shell slope to ensure 
workability, and it was placed at a staggering 
rate of one cubic yard every two minutes. In-
spection crews of engineers and carpenters, sta-
Figure 9: Roof segment being poured by workers with 
numbered shirts for coordination, Aug. 1960, Photo by 
TWA. 
tioned under the form work and at the ground level below observed a system of hanging plumbs 
from the roof so that the next bucket load could be placed at a compensating point for counter-
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balance if the form work moved. The largest roof section was 1 ,000 cubic yards and it took a full 
30 hours of continuous labor to pour and finish. To leave the concrete roof visible to planes 
above, the roof was coated with 1,500 gallons of silicone waterproofing material that prevented 
freeze/thaw damage to the concrete and facilitated faster runoff of rainwater to keep the roof 
looking clean. 
The Evolution of Intent and Expertise 
·· ... the reason why these (plastic forms) are being built now ... is really aesthetic and not econom-
ic; and we should face that. " Eero Saarinen, "Function, Structure, and Beauty," August 1957. 
The thoroughness of the design construction pro-
cess was rewarded as the finished shell form sagged con-
siderably less than anticipated upon the removal of the 
formwork and there were no noticeable shrinkage cracks 
(Figure 1 0). The project foreman Kenneth Morris, gave 
high praise to the process and people, calling the work the 
"The biggest challenge to concrete and concrete men I've 
seen in my 30 years of construction ... the teamwork was 
the finest I've ever seen ... and the 5,000 tons of sculptured 
concrete you see standing there is the best proofl know" 
(Yeakel, 1962). Saarinen never saw the building complete, 
but did see the scaffolding removed and boasted in a letter 
that, although there was a lot of concrete, " it is the least 
earthbound shell that has ever been built" (Saarinen, 1960). 
The construction challenges and structural failures 
at Kresge led to the incremental evolution in the structura l 
responsiveness and constructability ofTWA. This was in 
part due to Saarinen's willingness to accept and embrace a 
greater level of influence and expertise from the structural 
engineers during the early stages of design formation , and 
the correspondingly increased level of expertise in concrete 
shell design by the project teams in both offices born from 
Figure /0: Image ofTWA roof shortly 
after the formwork was removed, Nov. 
1960, Photo by B. Korab 
this collaboration. And although TWA was intentionally divergent from an efficient structural 
form, and it wasn't easy or economical to build, it advanced much of the early formative dia-
logue about the degree of influence that function, structural performance and constructability 
should (or shouldn 't) have in the derivation of a spatial she lls. Roche summarizes the efforts 
concisely, " It was a great moment in modern architecture ... even if some were appalled by the 
work, it was incredible." 
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